The role of discourse in family policy reform - the case of Finland by Nyby, Josefine et al.
CSP article 1540 post resub edit
https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018317745609
The role of discourse in family policy reform – the case of Finland
Josefine Nyby, Mikael Nygard, Janne Autto, Mikko Kuisma. Sonja Blum
Abstract
Since 2011 and the onset of the economic crisis, Finnish governments have pressed 
for structural reforms, including unpopular cuts to family benefits and services. This 
article analyses the government discourse used for legitimating some of these 
reforms: the cutbacks in the child benefit and the restriction of full-time childcare. It 
also assess whether this discourse bore the hallmarks of a neoliberal austerity 
discourse, which could suggest that the reforms were not just a matter of fiscal 
balancing but also a matter of neoliberal welfare state restructuring. We argue that 
the economic crisis was central in the powerful ‘communicative’ discourse used by 
the governments for legitimating unpopular cuts. Not only did it draw on ideas from 
an austerity discourse advocating financial sustainability, fiscal prudency and debt 
reduction, it was also impregnated by ideas from a neoliberal worldview questioning 
some of the main principles of the ‘Nordic’ family policy model. 
Keywords: family policy, reform, discourse, economic crisis, Finland, austerity, 
neoliberalism, Nordic model of welfare
 
Introduction: background, objectives and methods
In the comparative welfare state literature, Finland has been considered a member of
the Nordic family policy model (Bradshaw and Hatland, 2006; Korpi, 2000) 
characterised by relatively high female employment, family-friendly policies and 
gender equality (Forssén et al., 2008). Two of the most popular benefits in the 
Finnish family policy model are the universal child benefit for every child under 17 
years (with a supplement for single parents) and the universal public childcare 
system, which provides childcare for every child under school age (which starts at 
seven). These have played a central role for the economic wellbeing of families and 
served as a corner stone for the Finnish dual-earner model (Forssén et al., 2008). 
However, since the international financial crisis, the economic foundations of 
this system have become increasingly undermined. Since 2010, Finnish 
governments have pressed for cost containment and structural reforms in order to 
combat economic decline, soaring public debt and falling employment rates. This has
led to cutbacks in family policy, such as the cuts in child benefits (in 2012, 2014, and 
2015) and the restriction of the universal right to public childcare (in 2015) – reforms 
that were highly unpopular among both the public and family policy experts (e.g. 
Pohjanpalo, 2015) and thus politically risky enterprises (Vis, 2010). Although these 
reforms were incremental and did not entail dramatic cuts in benefit levels, they can 
nevertheless be seen as principally important, since they not only challenged the 
public opinion, but also eroded the idea of universal support for families and Finland’s
position in the Nordic family policy model (Ahrendt et al., 2015). 
The aim of this article is to analyse the discourse used by recent Finnish 
governments for legitimating the abovementioned unpopular reforms in family policy. i 
Using the concepts of ‘communicative’ discourse (Schmidt, 2002), austerity (Blyth, 
2013; Clarke and Newman, 2012) and neoliberalism (Taylor, 2007; Harvey, 2005) as 
starting points, we study the legitimating aspects of this discourse, but also to what 
extent it used ideas from what we call a neoliberal austerity worldview, which in turn 
could suggest that the reforms were not just a matter of fiscal balancing but step 
towards a reconfiguration of Finnish family policy in a neoliberal fashion. The 
research questions are: a) what policy recommendations, arguments, and ideas were
used in this discourse? b) to what extent did this discourse relate to a neoliberal 
austerity worldview? c) how effective was this discourse in creating political and 
public consent for cutbacks in these abovementioned welfare programs? 
In order to answer these questions, we used a triangulated methodological 
approach (Rothbauer, 2008) focussed on the analysis of discourse (cf. Schmidt, 
2002: 170) that combines various data sources and methods in search of a richer 
and more nuanced picture of a phenomenon. In our case we use a qualitative 
content analysis for identifying policy recommendations, arguments and ideas, that 
is, legitimating aspects of political discourses, rather than discourse analysis in a 
strict postmodern or deconstructionist sense (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). For this 
end, we combined inductive and deductive qualitative content analysis (e.g. Hsieh 
and Shannon, 2005) of government and parliamentary documents with expert 
interviews and analyses of survey data on government support ii. In short, in relation 
to the first research question, we inductively analysed government programs and bills
for policy recommendations, arguments and ideas, and for the second research 
question, we deductively analysed these arguments and ideas to establish to what 
extent these relate to a neoliberal worldview (see Tables 1 and 2). In relation to the 
third research question  pertaining to the ‘effectiveness of the discourse, that is, the 
level of consent (or opposition) that it created, we performed content analyses of 
minutiae (protocols) from debates in the Finnish parliament [the Eduskunta] and 
articles and editorials from the leading daily newspaper in Finland (Helsingin 
Sanomat).iii Furthermore we conducted five non-structured and qualitative interviews 
with leading family policy experts. The main idea here is that the efficiency of the 
governments’ austerity discourse is at least partly discernible from the degree of 
consent/opposition it causes among (competing) politicians and media. iv The coding 
of documental content was performed by two of the authors, and the coding process 
consisted of two stages: first, an initial reading was conducted to get a sense of the 
whole, whereupon the actual coding of the document commenced for each of the 
four cutbacks.v The coding process was checked for accuracy and inter-reliability on 
regular occasions. The five expert interviews were conducted in the fall of 2014 with 
leading researchers and experts in Finnish family policy. 
 The paper contributes to the literature on discourse of welfare state reform (e.g.
Hemerijck, 2013; Schmidt, 2002, 2008) and the power of neoliberal austerity ideas 
(Harvey, 2005; Farnsworth and Irving, 2015; Clarke and Newman, 2012), by showing
how the economic crisis, and ideas from an austerity and neoliberal discourse, 
became intertwined in a powerful ‘communicative’ discourse that helped recent 
Finnish governments to legitimate unpopular cuts in family policy – even at the 
expense of the ‘Nordicness’ of the Finnish family policy model. In this respect Finland
serves as an interesting case in comparison with, for example, Iceland where the 
financial crises did not lead to similar cutbacks in the welfare state (Stuckler and 
Basu, 2013). The rest of the article is structured as follows. Next, the theoretical 
framework is presented and in the following section we discuss the selected family 
policy reforms, the discourse underpinning them together with an assessment of their
effect. In the final section, a number of conclusions are drawn and discussed.
Ideas, discourses and the power of austerity
There are many ways of explaining the emergence, design and change of family 
policy (e.g. Wennemo, 1994). The theoretical starting points for this article can be 
found in theories about how ideas influence policy (Béland and Cox, 2010; Blyth, 
2010) and how they are linked to institutional discourses (Fischer, 2003; Schmidt, 
2002, 2008). Put simply, one common assumption here is that ideas and the 
discourses carrying them matter in politics. Ideas exercise cognitive and normative 
influence on how the social world is constructed and they generate discourses on 
what needs to be done for changing this world in ways that are conditioned by 
welfare-institutional configurations. Whereas cognitive ideas refer to logic and 
observation, telling us what the problem is and what the solutions to them are, 
normative ideas are attached to values and seek to legitimate policies, that is, telling 
us why something is important or why something needs to be done (Schmidt, 2008, 
p. 307).
Schmidt (2008: 306) distinguishes between three categories of ideas: specific 
policy ideas, general ideas, and ‘world views’. While specific policy ideas offer a 
solution to a certain problem, the more general ideas and ‘world views’ entail larger 
ideational constructions on society, economics or politics, and they also offer some 
kind of normative justification for specific policy ideas. As an example: ‘privatization’ 
can be seen as a specific policy idea, which in turn is related to a more general idea 
on ‘market efficiency’ in accordance with a neoliberal ‘world view’ (or ideology), which
sees markets as self-regulating and state intervention as ineffective (Taylor, 2007). 
Also, the term discourse can be defined in a multitude of ways. On a very 
general level, a distinction can be made between discourse as communicative 
interaction and discourse as a struggle for precedence of interpretation (cf. 
Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). While the former notion focuses more squarely on 
how different actors communicate and for example use arguments in order to create 
legitimacy, the latter uses more subtle analyses of language shape thought, or how 
different discourses compete with each other (ibid.). Schmidt (2002: 169) follows the 
former tradition in defining discourse as ‘whatever policy actors say to one another 
and to the public more generally in their efforts to construct and legitimate their policy
programs’. In this article, discourse is defined in a similar vein by referring to what 
governments ‘say’ about the need to pursue cutbacks in family policy, that is, the 
argumentation and ideas they invoke in order to legitimate cutbacks. According to 
Schmidt (2008), this often takes place in communicative discourses. Such discourses
are directed towards the public and explain a reform so the public may accept it, 
whereas coordinative discourses take place within the government and relate to 
technical aspects of how to carry out a specific reform. According to Schmidt (2002), 
these two discourses are both present in all policy making, but while the subjects of 
the discourses might be the same, the objectives and audiences are not.
A central notion in discursive institutionalism is that discourses are conditioned 
by institutional configurations and that communicative discourses are more prevalent 
in welfare states with more centralised power and less coordinated decision-making 
systems (Schmidt, 2002). This is also largely the case with Finland, where the 
decision-making process is rather centralised when it comes to tax-funded family 
benefits, such as the child benefits, and public childcare services, whereas parental 
leaves are regulated through tripartite negotiations between social partners (Lammi-
Taskula and Takala, 2009).vi Furthermore, child benefits and childcare services are 
universal with a strong sense of ‘citizen right’ (Lammi-Taskula and Salmi, 2013). 
Taken together, this means that governments are accountable to voters for possible 
cutbacks in tax-funded family benefits and childcare services, which accentuates the 
need to ‘avoid blame’ (Vis, 2010) through, for instance, powerful communicative 
discourses that obfuscate the responsibility for unpopular cutbacks (Schmidt, 2002). 
In this article we focus on one particular set of communicative discourse, the so-
called austerity discourse, which puts ideas of fiscal parsimony, government debt 
reduction and cost containment in the front (Blyth, 2013; Clarke and Newman, 2012; 
Farnsworth and Irving, 2015b). But we are also interested in how such a discourse 
may be related to neoliberal ideology (Taylor, 2007; Harvey, 2005). 
According to Farnsworth and Irving (2015: 1) Europe has entered a ‘new age of 
austerity’, which is characterised not only by a stronger focus on fiscal balance and 
tighter budget control, but also by cuts in public social expenditure and debt at the 
same time as it praises tax reductions and a de-regulation of labour markets. 
Although austerity is hard to pinpoint empirically both as a discourse and as a 
political phenomenon, the austerity discourse that surfaced after the international 
financial crises can be said to differ from earlier representations through its dominant 
position of being the ‘only alternative’ in debates on public policy and the welfare 
state (Blyth, 2013; Farnsworth and Irving, 2015; O’Hara, 2014; Clarke and Newman, 
2012). According to Blyth (2013: 226), it is a ‘dangerous idea’, since it is not only self-
defeating through its social costs and its incapacity to increase growth, but it is also 
‘ideologically immune to facts and basic empirical refutation’. 
The austerity discourse of today also seems to be highly influenced by 
neoliberal ideology (Taylor, 2007; Harvey, 2005), since tends to view welfare state 
expansion, fiscal stimulus and government spending as ‘logical’ anathemas while at 
the same time advocating expenditure cuts, tax reductions, less state involvement 
and greater wage and wealth dispersion in a neoliberal fashion (Blyth, 2013; Clarke 
and Newman, 2012). It has also been used as a default strategy to respond to 
economic by cutting debt and public expenditures for the general population while 
simultaneously ‘protecting the power and advantages of capitalist elites’ (McBride, 
2015: 68). This is why Clarke and Newman (2012) rightfully refer to this discourse as 
‘alchemy’; i.e. as an ideologically driven ’quick-fix’ in times of neoliberalism and 
globalisation. On the basis of this discussion it seems reasonable to view austerity 
discourses as a discursive offshoot of, or as a ‘naturalised common-sense’ 
continuation, of the neoliberalism that ‘strangely did not die’ (Crouch, 2011). Table 1 
thus highlights the key values, norms for public action as well as policy ideas of what 
we choose to call a neoliberal austerity worldview as compared to a Keynesian and a
social investment worldview. 
[TABLES 1 AND 2 SOMEWHERE AROUND HERE]
While Keynesian worldview, focusing on demand-side social policy and far-reaching 
equality ambitions, can be seen as a blue-print for Finnish welfare state expansion 
until the 1990s, the social investments worldview with a stronger focus on activation, 
human capital investments and ‘flexicurity’ became more pronounced in family 
policies of the late-1990s and early-2000s (Anttonen and Sipilä, 2012). Although 
Finland has experienced times of austerity politics before, most notably in the 1990s, 
with massive cutbacks in income transfers to families, these phenomena have been 
rather short-lived. However, after the international financial crisis in 2008-09 the 
focus on austerity politics grew stronger in Finland and became one of the most 
primarily objectives of the conservative-left coalition led by Prime Minister Katainen 
(Nygård and Autto, 2014; Ahrendt et al., 2015). One of the main goals for this 
coalition was to achieve financial sustainability through structural reforms, 
containment of public expenditure and debt reduction (ibid.), which not only proved 
hard to achieve but also caused protests and strikes (e.g. Reuters, 2015). This does 
not mean, however, that Keynesian or social investment ideas have been replaced 
altogether. Instead, it suggests that the competition between these worldviews and 
neoliberal ideas have become fiercer and that the recent economic crisis has opened
up for ideological renegotiations of the welfare state. As displayed in table 1, some of
the key values of this worldview relate to individual responsibility, freedom and 
equality in opportunity, whereas the general ideas relate to a limited state with a 
preoccupation for fiscal constraint and free and self-regulated markets. According to 
this view, family policy still plays a role, but not necessarily in a universal or an 
encompassing sense, since its main precedence concerns poverty reduction (Morel 
et al., 2012) rather than securing economic wellbeing or equality of families with 
children. This is the context in which recent governments in Finland, starting with the 
Katainen government in 2011, have set out to pursue unpopular reforms. 
Findings
The results show that all three governments (Katainen, Stubb, and Sipilä) employed 
elements from an austerity discourse in order to pursue unpopular cutbacks in child 
benefits (2012, 2014 and 2015) and in the subjective right to childcare (2015). This 
can be seen, for instance, through the strong position that policy ideas proposing 
cost containment and debt control have had in the governments’ discourses and how
they trumped over old-style social policy ambitions. Moreover, this discourse has 
been successful, since the governments have succeeded to achieve unpopular cuts 
without any dramatic costs in electoral supportvii and despite criticism from both the 
opposition and policy experts. Below we examine the discourse used by the 
Katainen, Stubb and Sipilä governments, and how it was received by opposition 
MPs, amongst family policy experts, and the media. 
The cutbacks in the child benefits
In accordance to the Nordic model of welfare, the main objectives of Finnish family 
policy have been to redistribute income between families with and without children 
(Hiilamo 2002). The popular child benefit, which became universal in the late 1940s, 
has worked as an efficient measure in economically compensating families with 
children. Regardless of its popularity, in 2012, PM Katainen’s Government presented 
a temporary index freezing of the child benefit for three years with effect from 2013 
(Government bill, 116/2012). This measure was mainly motivated by economic 
arguments, according to which cutting public expenditures, the child benefits 
included, is a necessity to restore financial sustainability and prevent government 
debt in times of sluggish growth. This exemplifies a specific policy idea, but also a 
more normative general idea in line with a neoliberal austerity worldview outlined in 
Table 1, as it signifies supremacy of fiscal prudence and debt control over principles 
of social welfare and equality, and depicts expenditure cuts as a way of ‘saving’ the 
welfare state.
In addition, arguments of diminution and compensation were frequently used in 
order to legitimate the cutback. Not only was the overall economic importance of the 
child benefit downplayed, which suggests the impact of the reform on families to be 
minimal (ibid.: 4), but vulnerable groups, such as single parents, were to be 
compensated by a raise in the single-parent supplement to child benefits. Legally 
speaking the cutback was seen as posing no problem since ‘according to the 
constitution, the social security can to some extent be lowered in accordance with the
economic resources’ of the country (ibid.: 4). 
A closer inspection of the ideational logic behind the government austerity 
discourse suggests a mixture of so-called cognitive and normative ideas (Schmidt, 
2008). Whereas cognitive elements can be traced in the attempt to invoke a 
‘common-sense’ notion on the need to stabilise the public economy, the normative 
elements are represented by the expectation that austerity measures will ‘generate 
economic stability’ and ‘balance state finances in the long run’ (ibid.: 4). In other 
words, there is a belief that cuts in the short run yield financial stability and growth in 
the long run, which rhymes with a neoliberal austerity discourse. However, the 
ambition to safeguard the economic wellbeing of vulnerable families suggests that 
the government also, to some extent, sought to uphold old-style Keynesian and 
social investment traditions of social equality.
This is also largely true for the governments of PM Stubb and PM Sipilä. Also 
in the programmes of these two governments the economic situation and the rising 
level of public debt served as foundation for and justification of for structural reforms 
and cutbacks in social policies and services. In 2014, PM Stubb’s Government 
launched a number of reforms aiming at curtailing public expenditures and making 
the social security system more activating (Government Program, 2014). Among 
other things, an 8.1% cutback in the child benefit was proposed (Government bill, 
165/2014). The argument behind this cutback was mainly an argument of economic 
necessity; in times of economic hardships, the state has no other alternative than to 
renegotiate its social policy commitments and even cut back on child benefits – 
regardless of their importance and popularity. 
The idea of adjusting public consumption to shrinking resources served as a 
powerful framing of unpopular reforms, and it became even more powerful when 
backed up by a context of a ‘weak global economy’ (especially in the Euro-zone) and 
‘the restructuring of the Finnish industry’ (ibid.: 4). The cutback was also underpinned
by arguments of compensation: the single-parent supplement was to be retained and
a child tax credit to be introduced for the poorest families (Government bill, 165/2014:
4–6). Normatively speaking, the cutback was informed by ideas of an allegedly 
positive outcome of cost containment on growth. Accordingly, austerity measures 
were needed to recover from the recession, even at a price of higher child poverty 
rates. Although the cutback increases child poverty in the short run, it is still 
considered the best alternative in the long run, as it improves the financial 
sustainability of the social security system thus helping to preserve the welfare state. 
According to Blyth (2013) the narrative of future gains from cost containments is 
typical for a neoliberal austerity worldview; its strength emanates from the idea that 
such measures will boost investors’ expectations and thus ‘produce expansion by 
cutting’ social expenditure (Blyth, 2013: 212). Furthermore, the cutback was 
considered as just, as it is ‘equally big’ and affects families in a similar way (ibid.: 4). 
In 2015, PM Sipilä continued to pursue cutbacks by proposing a cancellation 
of the child benefit indexation system with effect from January 2016 (Government bill,
70/2015). Similar to earlier cutbacks, this reform was legitimated mainly through 
economic arguments; public expenditure must be adjusted in relation to economic 
resources, even if this means cutbacks (Supplement to Government program 2015: 
8). Cognitive ideas referring to economic sustainability, frugality and modesty were 
used (e.g. ‘We [Finns] do not live on borrowed money’, ibid.: 5), but there were also 
referrals to historical experiences of hardship (the winter war, previous crises etc.) 
and personal sacrifice (solidarity) suggesting that ‘Finns understand that in the 
middle of the crisis, difficult decisions have to be made’ (ibid.: 7). Also, normative 
ideas referring to neoliberal values of ‘liberty’, ‘own responsibility’ and ‘less [state] 
regulation’ nurtured the argumentation behind the reforms (Supplement to 
Government program 2015: 5). Accordingly, the balance between the state and the 
individual needs to be renegotiated by giving individuals more responsibility and 
cutting state regulation – something that fits in with the neoliberal ideology behind the
austerity discourse (cf. Taylor, 2007).  
How, then, were the abovementioned cutbacks in child benefits received by 
other politicians, family policy experts and the media, that is, how ‘effective’ was the 
governments’ austerity discourse in creating consent in terms of the cutbacks in child
benefits? Although we cannot in fact measure this ‘effect’, the analysis suggests that 
the (neoliberal) austerity discourse was quite powerful. All three cutbacks were 
discussed with varying intensity in the Eduskunta, especially the 2014 cutback in the 
child benefit level caused a lengthy and heated debate (PTK 89/2014) resulting in 
mixed reactions, creating both consent and opposition. Whereas politicians from 
government parties agreed with the Government on most of the cutbacks, the 
politicians from opposition parties generally jibbed at the proposals. When it came to 
the 2012 indexation freezing of the child benefit (HE 116/2012), politicians from the 
opposition suggested that cutting this benefit ‘undermines the importance of the child 
benefit’ and that it will ‘decrease the income of families already on a small income’ 
(Hänninen, Left, PTK 89/2014). The opposition also pointed out that a cut will 
increase child poverty and diminish consumption, which in turn undermines growth. 
Also, the 2014 cutback in the child benefit level (HE 165/2014) led to both 
consent and opposition in the parliament, and that this reform was controversial is 
traceable from the large number of speakers (altogether 108 as compared to 8 in 
2012). Similar to 2012, MPs from government parties largely argued and voted for 
the cut, while politicians from the opposition parties argued and voted against the 
proposal. The government MPs emphasised that ‘cutting the child benefit feels bad’ 
but that refraining from cuts will lead to ‘all the welfare services [being] at stake’ 
(Wallinheimo, KOK, PTK, 89/2014). The opposition MPs suggested that this was 
‘more than anything an ideological choice’ (Niikko, TF, 89/2014), as ‘these kinds of 
inhumane decisions ruin the welfare state’ (Mäntylä, TF, PTK, 115/2014) and that 
‘the IMF have shown that the Euro crisis have been dealt with in the wrong ways by 
pursuing austerity measures’ (Modig, LEFT, PTK 89/204). Furthermore, the 
opposition MPs argued that such a cutback jeopardizes the well-being among 
families (Mäkipää, FP, 89/2014) and that families with children have been hit 
disproportionally hard in the government’s cost containment scheme (Juvonen, TF, 
PTK 155/2014). The opposition MP’s also said that there are other and more just 
ways of containing social expenditure (Rantakangas, CEN, PTK 155/2014) and that 
the future prospect of the child is undermined by the cutback (Juvonen, TF, PTK 
155/2014). A similar division was visible in 2015 when the indexation of the child 
benefit was abolished (HE 70/2015), but this time the cutback also caused some 
critique within the government’s own ranks, even if the government MPs eventually 
voted unanimously in favour of the cutback. The number of speeches in the 
Eduskunta was also smaller than in 2014 (49). Some government MPs tried to 
obfuscate the effect of the reform by arguing that an abolishment of the indexation is 
not ‘a direct cut’ (Saarikko, CEN, PTK 53/2015 vp) and that the motive for the reform 
is purely economic and ‘definitely not ideological’ (Zyskowicz, KOK, PTK 53/2015). 
Among opposition MPs, on the other hand, the cutback was largely seen as 
ideological – as one step in a long-term process of scaling down state responsibility 
for families (e.g. Pekonen, LEFT, PTK, 53/2015 vp). Furthermore, the opposition 
suggested that the cutback ‘will increase child poverty’ (Salonen, SDP, PTK, 
53/2015), and that the government is not following a predictable (family policy) line 
(Andersson, LEFT, PTK, 77/2015).
If the parliamentary debate showed both consent and opposition, this was not 
the case with the family policy experts interviewed for this article. Among the family 
policy experts, there was an unequivocal opposition to all three reforms, which not 
only became evident in the interviews, but also in media, as some of the experts 
used the media to express their opposition to the wider public. All the experts pointed
out that austerity measures and increasing unemployment rates have made families 
suffer economically and some thought that this would have negative long-term effects
on family wellbeing. Some of the experts argued that Finland has taken a U-turn 
towards a scarcer family policy, away from universalism, and that ill-being amongst 
families will increase despite any compensatory benefits such as the child tax credit 
(which does not help the poorest families with no income). One expert also 
suggested that the cutbacks in family policy was not an immediate effect of the 
economic crisis, but rather an effect of ideological choices made by recent right-wing 
governments starting with the right-left coalition led by PM Katainen. Furthermore, 
this expert highlighted that PM Stubb did indeed suggest that everyone, including 
families with children, has to participate in the cutbacks, suggesting the idea of 
austerity concerns everyone in society.
In relation to the experts, the reactions to the cutbacks in the child benefits in 
editorials of the leading Finnish newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, were more modest 
although a growing criticism became detectable in 2014. At first, there was no explicit
comments on the cutbacks in the child benefits, but in 2014, the tone changed and 
disappointment over the irresolution of the government and inconsistency in its family
policy-making was expressed (HS 29 Mar 2014). The government was criticised for 
going behind the backs of the people, as the government knew that this cutback 
would affect poor families negatively (HS 7 Apr 2016 and HS 9 Apr 2016). 
Furthermore, the introduction of the child tax credit, which was intended to 
compensate for the cutbacks, was criticised since it was seen to benefit only families 
with employed parent(s), but not the poorest of families (HS 6 Oct 2014). 
The restriction of the subjective right to childcare
Finland has been known for its universal public childcare system and its subjective 
right to childcare, which gives parents right to public childcare for all children under 
seven. The principle of universalism was introduced already in the 1970s, but it 
became instituted as a ‘subjective right’ only in the 1990s (Forssén et al., 2008; 
Hiilamo, 2002), and this right has played an important role in creating social equality 
among children and in minimizing class division (cf. Välimäki, 1999). In May 2015, 
the childcare legislation was even updated by strengthening the ideas of early 
education, early learning, childhood pedagogy and child wellbeing (HE 341/2014). At 
the same time, however, the economic crisis changed the political climate in Finland 
and made the government prone to reform and pursue cost containment in family 
policy. This is a reason why the newly enacted law on early childhood education and 
care [ECEC] was changed once again in December 2015 (Government bill, 80/2015) 
leading to a restriction of the right to full-day ECEC for children without both parents 
in full-time work, education, or on family leave to 20 hours per week. Although this 
reform did not entail any changes in fees or income testing, it constituted an 
important break with the previous principle to provide all children under seven, 
regardless of their parents’ labour market status, a right to full-day childcare. 
The arguments and ideas used for legitimating this restriction were relatively 
the same as in the case of child benefits. Not only was this restriction constructed as 
an economic necessity, but it was also seen as a way of activating parents by using 
the option of receiving full-day childcare as a ‘carrot’ for employment. Similar to the 
cutbacks in child benefits, the restriction of childcare created consent within the 
government’s own ranks, while the opposition MPs and the experts, as well as the 
media to some extent, opposed the reform. Already in 2011, in the government 
program of PM Katainen, there was a general creed for austerity measures to the 
public welfare services, as well as a recommendation of higher flexibility in public 
childcare. This was motivated by economic arguments, suggesting that an 
adjustment of the public economy is necessary ‘for the future of the welfare services’ 
(Government Program, 2011: 7). The idea of sustainability was used as a cognitive 
idea suggesting that cost containments are both inevitable and natural: ‘only a 
sustainable public economy […] can guarantee a sustainable welfare’ (ibid.: 10). The 
idea that economic necessity surpasses the principle of social welfare is an example 
of a normative idea that helped legitimating the cutbacks. Another example is the 
accentuation of employment: ‘the family’s income should first and foremost be 
received through employment’, which is also ‘the best form of social security’ (ibid.: 
6). There was, in other words, a building-up of arguments for structural reforms and 
cost containments already in the 2011 government program, but the actual 
proposition to restrict public childcare was presented in 2013 (Structural-Policy 
Program, 2013: 9) with effect from August 2016. Mostly economic arguments and 
cognitive ideas were employed for legitimating this restriction. Accordingly, structural 
reforms are necessary in order to close the ‘sustainability gap’ and for easing the 
pressure that the demographic change has put on the public sector (ibid.: 1). In 
addition, the idea that improved productivity and effectiveness of public services lead 
to higher financial sustainability was central (ibid.: 3). Meanwhile, a normative idea 
underpinning the restriction was that welfare services ought to be connected to one’s 
employment situation, or ‘restricted due to social circumstances’ (ibid.: 9), which can 
be interpreted as a quest for higher selectivity and a stronger accentuation of 
employment-based social rights on the behalf of universalism. 
In 2015, PM Sipilä’s government program proposed a restriction of the full-day
childcare to 20 hours per week if one parent stays at home due to family leave or 
unemployment. The main argument was economic; the childcare system costs too 
much and needs to be downscaled for the state to be able to balance its economy, 
but also other arguments were used. One built on the idea of compensation, 
according to which the private (child) care allowance are raised in order to facilitate 
private care for those children that cannot receive full-day public childcare. Another 
related to pluralism and targeting, i.e., the restriction still makes it possible for 
municipalities to provide full-day childcare if they want to, and they are obliged to do 
so if it seen as necessary due to the child’s social or developmental needs 
(Government Program, 2015). Again, the cognitive idea of creating economic 
sustainability was central: ‘the public finances [being] in equilibrium’ is the prime 
objective, even if this means cutback to popular welfare services (ibid.: 5). This idea 
was supported by the idea that the public will understand ‘why cutbacks need to be 
pursued’ (ibid.: 7). According to PM Sipilä, cutbacks help to preserve the welfare 
state, whereas further expansive policies would endanger it and ‘send the bill for 
today’s wellbeing to further generations’ (YLE, 2015). 
This bill also created both consent and opposition in Parliament. MPs from the
government parties (CEN, KOK, TF) supported the reform and argued that the 
restriction is an economic necessity, ‘a regrettable saving’, but that is not really a 
question of a cutback, since all children are ‘still guaranteed 20 hours of early 
childhood education and care per week’ (Grahn-Laasonen, KOK, PTK 61/2015). 
Furthermore ‘municipalities can still choose to offer full-day childcare’ if they want 
and it they find it necessary from the child’s perspective (ibid.) Another argument was
that the restriction is supported by the ‘majority of the public’ (Puumala, CEN, PTK 
61/2015) and that the restriction will be compensated ‘by other government 
investments’ (Grahn-Laasonen, KOK, PTK 61/2015), although no specific investment
was mentioned. The opposition MPs largely opposed the reform, by suggesting, for 
instance, that it undermines ‘the quality of ECEC services’ (Anderson, LEFT, PTK 
61/2015), increases social inequality and stigmatization among children ‘by dividing 
them into groups depending on the labour market position of the parents’ (Arhinmäki,
LEFT, PTK 61/2015), and it is a poor investment, as ‘every 1 euro spent on quality 
childcare gives 7 euro back to the society’ (Uotila, LEFT, PTK 61/2015). Furthermore,
some opposition MPs argued that parents working part-time not being taken enough 
into consideration (Östman, CHDEM, PTK 61/2015), and that the restriction is 
ideologically motivated as a conservative attack on public welfare services (Rinne, 
SDP, PTK 61/2016). Other MP’s supported the reform by highlighting the 
responsibility of parents ‘to care for their children at home’ (Räsänen, CHDEM, PTK 
77/2015).
Whereas the reactions in the parliament were mixed, the interviewed family 
policy experts all opposed a restriction of the right to public childcare. One expert 
suggested the reform is infringing upon ‘the freedom of choice for families’ when it 
comes to caring for a child at home or letting the child participate in full-time child 
care, which has been one of the cornerstones in Finnish family policy. It was also 
highlighted, that the restriction will have a negative impact on the parental 
employment rate, since unemployed parents will find it more difficult to look for jobs 
or to accept job offers as their children do not have right to full-time childcare. In this 
way, the government was said to undermining its own goals, especially regarding 
female employment but also in terms of reducing the gaps between rich and poor 
families. 
Also in editorials of the leading newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, there was 
opposition to the restriction of the subjective right to full-time public childcare, 
suggesting that this will increase inequality among children and create geographical 
differences, as richer municipalities, such as in the Helsinki area, will stand an 
economically better chance to offer full-time childcare (HS 26 Nov 2015). It was also 
highlighted, that he basic goal of the new childcare legislation (for a discussion, see 
Lundkvist et al 2017), to provide qualitative early education and care, will not be met 
due to the restriction (HS 1 Feb 2014; HS 31 Aug 2014). Furthermore, the 
government was criticised for its reluctance to listen to the experts in the field, who 
predicted that the restriction will have negative consequences on equality, learning 
and child wellbeing (HS 24 Jun 2015) and it was pointed out that priorities of the 
government have shifted since the last recession in the 1990s. Back then, the 
government was very keen on making public childcare available for all children under
seven, regardless of the employment situation of the parents, in order to promote 
wellbeing, equality, and economic growth. Today this is no longer the case, as 
politicians seem willing to sacrifice full-day childcare for the sake of financial 
sustainability (HS, 2 Apr 2014).
Conclusions and discussion
This article examined the discourse used by Finnish governments for legitimating 
unpopular reforms in family policy since 2011, namely cutbacks in the child benefit 
and in public childcare. The aim was to describe the arguments and ideas used in 
this ‘communicative’ discourse (Schmidt, 2002) to determine whether this discourse 
contained elements linked  to a neoliberal austerity worldview, and to discuss how 
‘effective’ this austerity discourse was for legitimating the reforms. Based on the 
findings, a number of conclusions can be drawn. 
First, in the discourse on pursuing the reforms the governments mostly used 
economic, activating, and compensating arguments. The governments were 
convinced that Finland no longer can afford its (Nordic) universal family policy – 
therefore cutbacks in this policy field is the only alternative, regardless of the 
consequences, such as increasing child poverty rates and stronger social division. 
Ideas about social protection being spurring and more activating became evident, 
especially in the case of restricting the subjective right to childcare. By pursuing this 
reform, the Sipilä government disregarded the important role ECEC plays in creating 
social equality among children and in minimizing class division (cf. Välimäki, 1999).  
Not only does this indicate that Finnish family policy is moving towards a more 
‘hybrid’ direction, but it also suggests an ideological turn towards a leaner model of 
welfare, where work is the primarily source of welfare, welfare services are more 
conditional, and income transfers become more targeted. Still, this does not 
necessarily imply an ideological turn to a ‘neoliberal’ model, since austerity measures
can be considered economical necessities in times of acute crisis. To what extent all 
this actually represents an infringement on the principle of universalism and the 
Nordic family policy model is still hard to say, but at least the principle of selectivity 
has become stronger (cf. Ahrendt el al., 2015). Moreover, the government discourse 
was also influenced by traditional Keynesian and social investment principles, such 
as social equality, which became visible – for example – in the decision to leave 
single parents’ child benefit supplements uncut.
Second, on basis of the conclusion above, it is clear that the government 
discourse used for legitimating the cutbacks contained elements from a neoliberal 
austerity worldview (see table 1). Although austerity measures are not novel in the 
history of the Finnish welfare state and most European countries employed such 
measures to recover from the international financial crisis, it is striking how powerful 
this discourse became in the Finnish case after 2011 and how it trumped everything, 
including central Nordic family policy principles. The main arguments underpinning 
the governments’ austerity discourse were based on cognitive ideas of economic 
necessity and there being ‘no alternative’ to the cutbacks (cf. Schmidt, 2008; Blyth, 
2013). Interestingly, the Finnish general government gross debt as percentage of 
GDP at the time of the cutbacks varied between 48.5% and 63.6% (Eurostat, n.d.), 
which is by no means alarmingly high in international comparison. Still, these ‘no 
alternative’ arguments were given precedence, suggesting there were more 
profound, and ideological, interests at stake. Other cognitive ideas referred to how 
cost containment actually saves the welfare state and generates financial stability 
and growth in the long run, and how important it is that we all make ‘personal 
sacrifices’, although how this benefits families with children in the long run remains 
unsaid. Interestingly, the government repeatedly used arguments based on future 
growth and financial sustainability, although the literature on austerity politics (e.g. 
Blyth, 2013; O’Hara, 2015) agrees that austerity measures do not favour growth. 
Third, although we cannot measure the ‘effectiveness’ in the governments’ 
‘communicative’ discourse in creating political and public consent for the reforms, it 
seems plausible that this discourse was rather effective, especially in the way it 
created consent within the governments’ own ranks. Another way in which it can be 
seen as effective, is that it managed to frame the discussion about cutbacks in a way 
that was rather consistent and was based on elements of austerity discourse. 
Although the cutbacks were met with hard criticism from not only opposition MPs, 
family policy experts and partly the media, but also from experts in child welfare from 
Mannerheim League for Child Welfare [Mannerheimin lastesuojeluliitto] (ÅU 26 Mar 
2014; HBL 20 Nov 2015), the government succeeded in carrying them out. Although 
this need not necessarily be a problem for a united majority coalition in a Finnish 
parliamentary context with few veto rights, it is still problematic since unpopular 
reforms can punish the politicians in terms of future electoral losses (Vis, 2010). From
a glance at the development of voter support for the three parties in the incumbent 
government, it seems as if the discourse on cutbacks has been partly successful also
from a public point of view. Since pursuing the examined unpopular reforms, the two 
main parties, the Centre Party and the Conservative Kokoomus, have only suffered 
minor losses, while the Finns Party have lost about eight percentage points (from 
17% to 9%) of its voter support since the general election of 2015 (YLE, 2016). 
It seems plausible, then, to conclude that although the economic crisis was the
central driver behind the cutbacks made in the Finnish family policies since 2011, the
communicative discourse behind the cuts was fuelled by ideas from a neoliberal 
austerity discourse. In the face of the crisis, the governments chose to cut back on 
popular welfare programs aiming at protecting families with children. The 
governments pursued these highly unpopular reforms in spite of objection from other 
MPs, family policy experts and the media, and even in spite of the political risk it 
implied. What the long-term effects of these cutbacks will be is still too early hard to 
say, but they will likely have a negative effect on child poverty and undermine the 
level of social equality in the Finnish model of welfare.  
References
Anttonen A and Sipilä J (2000) Suomalaista sosiaalipolitiikkaa. Tampere: Vastapaino.
Ahrendt D, Blum S and Crepaldi C (2015) Families in the economic crisis: Changes 
in policy measures in the EU. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European 
Union. 
Béland D (2010) The idea of power and the role of ideas. Political Studies Review 
8(2): 145–154. DOI: 10.1111/j.1478-9302.2009.00199.x
Béland D and Cox RH (2010) Introduction: Ideas and Politics. In: Béland D and Cox 
RH (eds) Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research. New York: Oxford University
Press, pp. 1–17.
Blyth M (2013) Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Bradshaw J and Hatland A (2006) Introduction. In: Bradshaw J and Hatland A (eds) 
Social Policy, Employment and Family Change in Comparative Perspective. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 1–12.
Clarke J and Newman J (2012) The alchemy of austerity. Critical Social Policy 32(3), 
299–319. DOI: 10.1177/0261018312444405
Crouch C (2011) The strange non-death of neoliberalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Eurostat (2016) Gender statistics. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Gender_statistics#Publications (accessed 1 February 2017)
Eurostat (n.d.) General government gross debt. Avaliable at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?
tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdde410&plugin=1. (Accessed on 1 
February 2017).
Farnsworth K and Irving Z (2015). Austerity: more than the sum of its parts. In: 
Farnsworth K and Irving Z (eds) Social Policy in Times of Austerity. Bristol: The 
Policy Press, pp. 9–21.
Fischer F (2003) Reframing public policy. Discursive politics and deliberative 
practices. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Forssén K, Jaakola A-M and Ritakallio V-M (2008) Family Policies in Finland. In: 
Ostner I and Schmitt C (eds) Family Policies in the Context of Family Change. 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp 75–88.
Harvey D (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxord University Press. 
Hemerijck A (2013) Changing welfare states. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hiilamo H (2002) The Rise and Fall of Nordic Family Policy? Historical development 
and changes during the 1990s in Sweden and Finland. PhD Thesis: Turun Yliopisto. 
Helsinki: Stakes. 
Hsieh HF and Shannon S (2005) Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. 
Qualitative Health Research, 15(9): 1277–1288. DOI: 10.1177/1049732305276687.
Hufvudstadstbladet [HBL] (2015) “Regeringen vidgar klyftorna mellan barnfamiljer”. 
Available at http://gamla.hbl.fi/nyheter/2015-11-19/779089/regeringen-vidgar-klyftor-
mellan-barnfamiljer
Jorgensen MW and Phillips LJ (2002) Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. 
London: Sage. 
Korpi W (2000) Faces of Inequality. Gender, Class, and Patterns of Inequalities in 
Different Types of Welfare States. Social Politics 7(2): 127–191. DOI: 
10.1093/sp/7.2.127.
Lammi-Taskula J and Salmi M (2013) Interview in ’Ajantasan lauantaivieras’, 5 
October, 2013. Available at: http://areena.yle.fi/1-2051013. Accessed 20 January, 
2014. 
Lammi-Taskula J and Takala P (2009) Finland: negotiating tripartite compromises. In:
Kamerman S and Moss P (eds) The politics of parental leave policies Bristol: Policy 
Press, pp. 87–102.
Lundkvist M, Nyby J, Autto J and Nygård M (2017) From universalism to selectivity? 
The background, discourses and ideas of early childhood education and care reforms
in Finland. Early child development and care. DOI: 10.1080/03004430.2017.1235041
McBride S (2015) The economics of austerity. In Farnsworth K and Irving Z (eds) 
Social Policy in times of austerity. Bristol: The Policy Press, pp. 67–85.
Ministry of Finance (2012) Valtiontalouden kehykset vuosille 2013—2016 [State 
economy framework 2013–2016]. Helsinki: Ministry of Finance. Available at: 
http://vm.fi/documents/10623/307577/Valtiontalouden+kehykset+vuosille+2013-
2016/677fc144-05df-491e-8e60-78540e14bb80 (accessed 14 Dec 2016)
Nygård M and Autto J (2014) Finnish family policy at the crossroads? The financial 
crisis and its repercussions on state support for families with children. The 2014 
Annual Conference of the Comparative European Politics Specialist Group of the 
Political Studies Association, UK, A Europe in Crisis, A Europe in Flux, University of 
Gothenburg, Sweden, November 6-7, 2014.
O’Hara M (2014) Austerity bites. A journey to the sharp end of cuts in the UK. Bristol: 
Policy Press. 
Pohjanpalo O (2015) Eduskunnassa myrskyisä keskustelu: Lapselle jää oikeus 20 
tunnin päivähoitoon, Helsingin Sanomat 10 November 15.
Reuters (2015) Finland, the New 'Sick Man of Europe,' Agonizes Over Austerity. Nov 
22, 15. NBC News. Available at: http://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/finland-
new-sick-man-europe-agonizes-over-austerity-n461761. (Accessed 13 Dec 2016).
Rothbauer P (2008) Triangulation. In: Given L (ed) The SAGE Encyclopaedia of 
Qualitative Research Methods. London: Sage Publications, pp. 892–894.
Schmidt V (2002) Does Discourse matter in the politics of welfare state adjustment? 
Comparative Political Studies, 35(2): 168–193. DOI: 10.1177/0010414002035002002
Schmidt V (2008) Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and 
Discourse. Annual Review of Political Science 2008(11): 303–326. DOI: 
10.1177/0010414002035002002
Stuckler D and Basu S (2013) The Body Economic. Why austerity kills. New York: 
Basic Books.
Taylor G (2007) Ideology and Welfare. London: Sage. 
Wennemo I (1994) Sharing the Costs of Children. Studies on the Development of 
Family Support in the OECD Countries. PhD Thesis, Stockholm: Sweden. 
Vis B (2010) The Politics of Risk-taking. Welfare state reform in advanced 
democracies. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Välimäki A-L (1999) Lasten hoitopuu: Lasten päivähoitojärjestelmä Suomessa 1800- 
ja 1900-luvulla Helsinki: Suomen kuntaliitto.
YLE (2015) Speech by PM Juha Sipilä 16.9.2015. Available at 
http://yle.fi/uutiset/katso_ja_lue_sipilan_puhe_tasta_kokonaisuudessaan/8311098 
(accessed 13 December 2016).
YLE (2016) Gröna har rekordstöd i Yles mätning – stora partierna närmar sig 
varandra. Yle Nyheter 8.6.2016. Avaliable at: 
http://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2016/06/08/grona-har-rekordstod-i-yles-matning-stora-
partierna-narmar-sig-varandra   (accessed 13 December 2016).
Åbo Underrättelser [ÅU] (2014) Barnskyddsförbund besviket på nedskärningar i 
barnunderstöd. Available at 
http://www.abounderrattelser.fi/news/2014/03/barnskyddsforbund-besviket-pa-
nedskarningar-i-barnunderstod.html
Table 1. Different worldviews on social (and family) policy (a modification of table 
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Table 2 Instructions for coding the neoliberal austerity discourse for research question 2. 
Key policy ideas 
(neoliberal 
austerity)
Description Example (cognitive and normative idea)
Fiscal balance Utterances for general 
greed for austerity 
measures, e.g. to 
balance and increase the
public economy
Cognitive idea: limiting public spending safeguards economic growth. 
‘Only a secure public economy…can guarantee a sustainable welfare’
Normative idea: social protection needs to be activating. 
‘Work is the best type of social security’ 
Cost 
containment
Utterances for cost 
containment, e.g. cutting 
the child benefit and 
restricting the subjective 
right to public child care 
in order to reduce public 
expenditure 
Cognitive idea: austerity measures are a necessity and promote 
economic growth in the long run, austerity needed due to weakened 
competitiveness due to economic globalization.
‘By index-freezing the child benefit…reduces the cost relating to the child
benefit in 2013 by 38 million Euros’ 
Normative idea: welfare services are somewhat more connected to 
employment situation (accentuation of selectivity alongside 
universalism), which also will spur parents to work
‘The idea is to support the provider to [return to or enter] the labour 
market..’ 
Targeting of 




people or targeting those 
in need, e.g. by raising 
the sole provider addition
and income support
Cognitive idea: austerity measures a necessity but the most poor still 
need protection.
‘By making other benefits [for the poorest] index-linked bond…the 
poorest will maintain the purchasing power’
Normative idea: although cutting benefits will increase the rate in child 
poverty, the government consider this equally unfair and the best of two 
bad options.
‘This cut…is also, from a child’s broader perspective, the most 




Utterances relating to 
increasing the 
individual’s responsibility,
e.g. by restricting the 
right to public childcare
Cognitive idea: economic sustainability, social expenditure to be scaled 
down in relation to economic resources, cost efficiency. 
Normative idea: social security need to be activating and spurring, 
accentuation of liberty, own responsibility and less [state] regulation, the 
state is to have a limited role, welfare services connected to 
employment. 




Utterances relating to 
freedom of choice, e.g. 
when it comes to 
activating social security 
(in which child benefit is 
included)
Cognitive idea: higher flexibility for parents.
‘Possibilities for families with young children in combining work-life 
balance is supported [by the government].’ 
Normative idea: accentuation on the responsibility of and freedom of 
choice of the individual, the state has a (limited) supportive role
‘Support is provided to all people of all ages, to enable them to take 
responsibility for their own state of health and lifestyles.’
Privatization of 
welfare services
Utterances for privatizing 
welfare services, e.g. by 
raising financial support 
for parents who choose 
private childcare
Cognitive idea: public expenditure is too expensive.
‘…even in normal economic times…the public finances are not 
enough…’
Normative idea: more financial support for those choosing private 
childcare.
‘A bigger amount will be paid [for those choosing private childcare]…’
Endnotes
i Three governments were analysed. The Katainen right-left coalition (2011–2014) included Conservatives, Christian 
Democrats, Social Democrats, the Left-wing Alliance, the Green League and the Swedish People’s party (the Greens 
and Left-wing alliance left the government in 2013 and 2014, respectively). The Stubb right-left coalition (June 2014–
May 2015) was an ideological successor of the previous four-party coalition. The Sipilä centre-right coalition 
(inaugurated May 2015) included the Centre Party, Conservatives and the Finns party.   
ii The data consisted of three government programs (2011, 2014 and 2015) with one supplement (2015), two supporting 
statements (2011 and 2016), four government bills (HE 116/2012 vp, HE 165/2014 vp, HE 70/2015 vp and HE 80/2015
vp), 58 leaders from Helsingin Sanomat (Dec 2011 – Apr 2016). Furthermore, five expert interviews were conducted 
with leading family policy experts from the Ministry of Social Welfare and Health, Finnish National Social Insurance 
Institution (KELA) and the National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL).
iii Helsingin Sanomat is the largest daily newspaper in Finland and plays an important role as an independent political 
commentator and opinion builder. Since 1932 it has been politically independent and party non-aligned.
iv It should be acknowledged, though, that we cannot in fact ‘measure’ this effect and that any plausible association 
between discourse and reform is destined to be tentative at best. 
v The four cutbacks analysed are the 2012 amendment of the child benefit indexation system (HE 116/2012 vp), the 
2014 cutback in child benefits by 8.1 % (HE 165/2014 vp), the 2015 abolishment of child benefit indexation (HE 
70/2015 vp) and the 2015 restriction of childcare rights for children with at least one parent at home (HE 80/2015 vp).
vi It should be noted though that local municipalities are responsible for producing childcare services and for collecting 
user fees.
vii The electoral consequences of the cutbacks are difficult to assess. Some parties, such as the Left-wing alliance left 
the Katainen right-left coalition in 2014 in protest against the cutbacks and managed to avoid some of the blame in that 
way. In the case of the Finns Party, however, the restriction of childcare and other cutbacks can explain some of the 
electoral backlash of the party, from a voter support of approx. 17 % in the 2015 national election to approx. 9 % in 
June 2016 (YLE, 2016). 
